Records · Evidence review
Impact review — AI pages (/ai/do/, /ai/practice/, /ai/learn/)
The working record behind the pages, published as written. Source file source/impact/ai-2026-11-05.md. All records.
Reviewed 2026-11-05 (fetches 20:54–22:40 EST). Reviewer: Claude (Fable 5.1), with one status-check subagent for organisations and laws. Content pages were not edited; nothing committed.
0. Method
Decision being informed. Which actions the AI Do and Practice pages should recommend, in what order, and with what evidence grade. The decider is Isaac. The population is one person with no special position, a few hours a month and a modest budget. What is being estimated: whether each action protects the reader's (and others') learning, attention, grip on what is true, or safety, as the pages frame those harms.
Grades, fixed before reading the results.
- strong — two or more independent randomised or field experiments, or a meta-analysis, pointing the same way on the outcome the page claims.
- moderate — one well-powered RCT or quasi-experiment, or several consistent smaller or short-term studies, or RCTs on a close proxy of the page's action.
- weak — small, preprint, self-report or correlational, or the measured outcome is a proxy (e.g. "recognises a manipulation technique" rather than "shares less falsehood").
- none-but-plausible — no study of the action itself; a plausible mechanism; no evidence of harm.
- contradicted — the best available evidence finds no effect, or the opposite, on the outcome the page claims.
Provenance tags used below. [F] opened and read by me today; [F-sub] opened by the status subagent today (its observations trusted; its three load-bearing conclusions re-checked by me against the primary page, noted where done); [F-earlier] opened in the earlier 2026-11-05 session and recorded in source/research/ai.md (same day, not re-opened by me); [record] an identifier lookup (Europe PMC, OpenAlex, Semantic Scholar, PMC ID converter) whose abstract or metadata I read, not the paper; [unread] seen only as a search snippet or not reachable. Grades for sources: primary / research / preprint / charity's own figures / news / industry.
What limited the work. The session's shared web-search budget was exhausted after my first query; the rest of the work used direct URLs, DOI and title lookups in scholarly databases, and publisher pages. Publisher blocks (PNAS, Science, OUP, SAGE, Elsevier, SSRN, OpenAI, World Bank repository) were worked around through PMC, Europe PMC full text, OpenAlex/Semantic Scholar records, saved PDFs read with pdftotext, and author or government pages. Where the only reachable copy is an abstract, the grade says "abstract-level".
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A. The evidence behind each action on the pages
A1. Learning: "think first, hints not answers, make it argue, check facts, keep one skill AI-free"
The mode-of-use finding (page's lede and step 1). Grade: moderate for "tutor-style use beats answer-style use"; weak for "typing 'don't give me the answer' reproduces a designed tutor".
- Bastani et al., PNAS 122(26), 2025
[F]research. RCT at classroom level, "nearly 1,000 students" in about fifty 9th–11th-grade classes at one high school in Turkey, Fall 2023, four 90-minute sessions. Three arms: control (textbook, no device); GPT Base (GPT-4 chat); GPT Tutor (GPT-4 with teacher solutions, common mistakes and an instruction to give hints, not answers). Assisted practice: GPT Base +0.137 on a 0–1 scale (control mean 0.284, about +48%), GPT Tutor +0.361 (+127%). Unassisted exam: GPT Base −0.054 (SE 0.022, p<0.05, about −17%); GPT Tutor −0.004 (SE 0.013, not significant). Students in GPT Base did not perceive they had learned less; GPT Tutor students thought they had done better although they had not. Limits stated by the authors: one subject (maths), one school, Fall 2023 models, short-term outcomes only. The page's "17% worse" and "hints lost nothing" are correct; "about a thousand students" is correct ("nearly 1,000"). - Anthropic, How AI assistance impacts the formation of coding skills, 29 Jan 2026
[F]research (company). RCT, 52 mostly junior engineers; quiz 50% (AI) vs 67% (control), d=0.738, p=0.01; AI group two minutes faster, not significant. The usage-pattern analysis (conceptual questions ≈65%, delegation ≈39%) is descriptive, n=2–7 per pattern; the authors say it "does not establish a causal link". - Contractor & Reyes, Experimental Evidence on the Learning Impact of Generative AI, arXiv 2607.08849 v2, 4 Oct 2026
[F]preprint. Proctored RCT, 211 Middlebury undergraduates, Spring 2025, GPT-4o. Immediate test +7.2 pp (0.28 SD, p=0.021); one week later +3.9 pp (0.21 SD, p=0.068). "Augmentation" users kept a gain a week later (0.24 SD, p=0.095), "automation" users did not (−0.24 SD, ns) — but use type was coded after the fact, not randomised. Rule violations could account for 17–22% of the immediate effect. The page's "one 2026 preprint found a lasting gain" is fair if "lasting" means one week. - Kestin, Miller, Klales, Milbourne & Ponti, Scientific Reports 15:17458, 2025
[F]research. Randomised crossover, 194 eligible of 233 Harvard physics students, Fall 2023; a GPT-4 tutor built on the same pedagogy as the in-class active-learning lesson (expert-written, question-specific prompts, cognitive-load management, growth-mindset framing, instructional videos). Median post-test 4.5 vs 3.5; effect size 0.63 (regression), 0.73–1.3 SD (quantile regression avoiding ceiling); median time on task 49 min vs 60; engagement 4.1 vs 3.6 (p<0.0001). Authors: gains "may depend on" expert prompts and structure; they "do not presume" the tutor beats active learning for higher-order synthesis. This is the strongest positive tutor result, and it is a designed tutor, not a reader's prompt. - De Simone et al., World Bank, From Chalkboards to Chatbots (blog 9 Jan 2025
[F]; working paper 11125, May 2025[record]OpenAlex abstract; repository page blocked). RCT, after-school programme, six weeks June–July 2024, Edo State, Nigeria; Microsoft Copilot (GPT-4) for English with teacher support. Overall assessment +0.31 SD, English +0.23 SD, "equivalent to 1.5–2 years" of business-as-usual schooling; girls gained more; attendance disrupted by flooding and strikes. Number of students not retrieved today. - Wang, Ribeiro, Robinson, Loeb & Demszky, Tutor CoPilot, arXiv 2410.03017 v3 (10 Oct 2026)
[F]preprint. RCT with 900 human tutors and 1,800 K-12 students: AI assisting the human tutor raised mastery +4 pp (p<0.01), +9 pp for students of lower-rated tutors; $20 per tutor per year. Different action (AI behind a human), but relevant to "who benefits". - Meta-analyses, kept as a dispute: Wu et al., Humanities & Social Sciences Communications 13, 2026
[record]— 35 experiments, 4,193 participants, g=0.670, no publication bias detected (abstract-level). Deng et al., Computers & Education 227, 2024[record]— 69 articles, positive, "methodological limitations… call for cautious interpretation". Wang & Fan 2025 (g=0.867) was retracted on 22 April 2026 "due to concerns relating to discrepancies in the meta-analysis"; the authors did not respond[F]. Bartoš, Martinková & Wagenmakers, PsyArXiv, 12 May 2025[record]OSF abstract: once publication bias is modelled, Wang & Fan's effects "greatly diminish… and the evidence in favor of the benefits disappears." Any page figure drawn from "meta-analyses show AI helps learning" should not be used. - Kosmyna et al., Your Brain on ChatGPT, arXiv 2506.08872 v2 (31 Dec 2025)
[F]preprint: 54 participants, 18 in session 4; "Brain-to-LLM" group showed higher recall than LLM-first. Comment by Stankovic et al., arXiv 2601.00856 (29 Dec 2025)[F]preprint: sample size, reproducibility, EEG methods, reporting inconsistencies, transparency. The page's labels ("unreviewed, small; 18 people") are correct. - Lee et al. (Microsoft Research / CMU), CHI 2025
[F]research: survey, 319 knowledge workers, 936 examples; higher confidence in the AI associated with less critical thinking. Correlational self-report. The page's "Make it argue against you" rests on this; the prompt itself has never been tested.
Grades for the page's learning actions.
| Action | Grade | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Ask for hints/questions, not answers, when learning | moderate | Bastani (direction of the arm difference), Contractor & Reyes (augmentation durable), Anthropic (patterns), Kestin and Nigeria (designed tutors work). No trial randomises a user's prompt. |
| Write your own rough pass first | weak | Kosmyna (18 people, preprint, disputed); Contractor & Reyes time-use (writing share fell 5.3 pp with AI). |
| Make it argue against you | none-but-plausible | Only correlational self-report (Lee et al.). Untested as an intervention. |
| Check every fact you'll repeat | moderate (as lateral reading, A2) | See A2. |
| Keep one skill AI-free | weak-to-moderate | Mechanism supported (Bastani: harm appears when the crutch is removed; Dell'Acqua: 19% less likely correct outside the frontier; IASR colonoscopy deskilling [F-earlier]). No trial of the habit. |
A2. Truth: "find the original, don't trust your eyes or a detector, don't swing to all-fake, safe word"
| Action | Grade | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Don't trust your eyes or a free detector | strong | Diel et al. 2024 meta-analysis of 56 papers [record] (Semantic Scholar abstract): overall human detection 55.54% (95% CI 48.87–62.10); audio 62%, video 57%, image 53%, text 52%; feedback training, AI support or caricaturisation lift it to 65%. Köbis et al. 2021 [F]: 210 people, 57.6%; telling people about deepfakes and paying for accuracy did not help; overconfidence r=−0.475 with accuracy. Groh et al. 2022 [F]: 15,016 people, individuals 66–72%, crowds 74–86%, model 65–80%; a wrong model prediction cut accuracy by 2.7% on average and up to 18%. Mai et al. 2023 [F]: 529 listeners, 73% on speech deepfakes; five examples beforehand added only 3.84 pp. Deepfake-Eval-2024 [F-earlier]: open detectors lose about half their accuracy in the wild. Liang et al. 2023 [F]: GPT text detectors flagged 61.3% of non-native writers' essays as AI, near 0% of native essays. |
| Find the original before you share (lateral reading) | moderate | Brodsky et al. 2021 [F]: quasi-experiment, 230 students, six lessons; students scoring 4 (read laterally and judged correctly) on ≥1 problem rose from 7% to 61% in taught sections, control mean 0.03 problems; retention untested; non-random. Wineburg et al. 2022 (district-wide field study) paywalled, [record] metadata only — not read. Kozyreva et al. 2024 toolbox [F] lists lateral reading among nine intervention types from 81 papers; the evidence ratings are behind the paywall. |
| Pause for accuracy before sharing | moderate-to-strong | Pennycook & Rand 2022 [F]: 20 experiments, N=26,863; accuracy prompts raised sharing discernment 71.7% over control, mainly by cutting sharing of false headlines 10%; effect modest, US-only, one field test. Pennycook et al. 2021 Nature [F]: a single accuracy message to Twitter users raised the quality of what they later shared (field numbers not in the readable extract). Guess et al. 2020 [F]: Facebook's "tips" reduced belief in false headlines from 32% to 24% (US, n=4,907), discernment +26.5%; effect fell by more than half in ~3 weeks; no effect in a face-to-face Indian sample; slightly lowered belief in true headlines too. |
| Don't swing to "it's all fake" | strong for the phenomenon; instruction untested | Altay & Gilardi 2024, n=4,976 [F-earlier]; Schiff, Schiff & Bueno 2024 [F]: five experiments, 15,287 adults; crying "misinformation" helped politicians against text scandals (0.17–0.21 SD) but mostly failed against video; a fact-check eliminated the gain. Vaccari & Chadwick 2020 [record]: UK, "more likely to feel uncertain than to be misled"; uncertainty lowered trust in news. |
| Content Credentials check | none-but-plausible | Tool live [F-sub]; C2PA FAQ limits [F-earlier]; credentials optional, stripped by many platforms, and were forged in 2023 and 2024 (Hacker Factor [F-sub], fixed by spec 2.1). No study of ordinary users' decisions. |
| Gemini "was this created with Google AI?" | none-but-plausible, narrow | Live, now covers video (<90 s) and audio (<1 h), ~10 checks per type per day, Google-made content only [F-sub]. No error reports found. |
| Reverse image search | none-but-plausible | No experiment found. |
| Family safe word | none-but-plausible | FBI PSA 3 Dec 2024 [F-earlier]; FBI PSA 15 May 2025 adds "verify via an independently found number" [F-sub]. No trial. The harm is measured: IC3 2025 report, 22,364 AI-related complaints, $893,346,472 losses; "distress scams" >$5 million [F-sub]. Mai 2023 shows why a process rule beats listening. |
Note for the Practice drill: Diel's pooled figures make the drill's "you can't tell by looking" line stronger than the page's current single citation.
A3. Attention and feeds
| Action | Grade | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Switch feeds to Following/chronological (for your time, not your politics) | moderate for time; the page already concedes the rest | Guess et al., Science 2023 [record] (abstract via Semantic Scholar; publisher blocked): chronological feeds "substantially decreased the time" on Facebook and Instagram, raised exposure to political and untrustworthy content, lowered uncivil content, and "did not significantly alter" polarisation or knowledge over three months. Bagchi et al., arXiv 2409.18393 [F]: Meta's post-election emergency measures reduced misinformation in the control group, so the study may understate what the algorithm does in normal times. Milli et al. 2025 [F-earlier]: engagement ranking amplifies anger and out-group hostility (~0.24 SD); users rated its political picks lower. Piccardi et al., Science 2025 [F]: 1,256 users, 10 days, reranking shifts out-party animosity by 2 points on a 100-point thermometer. |
| Take a platform or mobile internet off your phone for weeks | moderate (RCTs; trade-offs) | Allcott et al., AER 2020 [F] (working-paper PDF): 2,743 recruited, four weeks before the 2018 midterm; freed 60 min/day; well-being +0.09 SD (25–40% of a psychological intervention); polarisation index −0.16 SD; news knowledge −0.19 SD; post-experiment mobile use −22%. Allcott et al., PNAS 2024 [F]: 19,857 Facebook and 15,585 Instagram users, six weeks before the 2020 election; polarisation effects "precisely estimated and close to zero"; news knowledge −0.098 SD; Facebook deactivation lowered belief in three false claims; Meta-funded, "Meta could not block any results". Castelo et al. 2025 [F-earlier]: 467 people, two weeks without mobile internet; well-being d=0.45, attention d=0.23, only 25% complied ten days. |
| YouTube history off, TikTok/X paths | none-but-plausible | No study; mechanics from help pages [F-earlier]. |
The Haidt–Odgers dispute, kept as a dispute: Odgers, Nature, 29 Mar 2024 [F] — "Most data are correlative", associations "no, small and mixed", reverse causation (Heffer 2019), 72-country roll-out study with no consistent association (Vuorre & Przybylski 2023), and the warning that the story "might distract us from effectively responding to the real causes"; she calls device bans and age limits "unlikely to work and possibly counterproductive". Haidt, After Babel, 22 Feb 2023 [F] — r≈.20 for girls once sex and social media are separated, 12 of 18 experiments and 24 of 33 longer-interval longitudinal studies showing harm, and "effects that accumulate over time and at scale". His direct reply to Odgers was not fetched.
A4. Kids and companion bots
| Action | Grade | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| No social AI companions under 18 | weak-to-moderate evidence of harm; the rule is expert judgment, now law-backed | Common Sense Media + Stanford Brainstorm, 30 Apr 2025 [F]: Character.AI, Nomi, Replika "and others"; sexual exchanges easily elicited, harmful advice, bots claiming to be real; rating "Unacceptable". Methodology page [F] (re-checked by me): five-level scale, researcher judgment, companies see findings pre-publication but "don't get to approve or edit"; the Institute "is funded by both philanthropy and industry, including the makers of some of the technologies we evaluate". Fang et al. 2025 preprint [F-earlier]: 981 people, four weeks; assigned conditions null; heavier self-chosen use correlated with dependence. IASR 2026 [F-earlier]: evidence "mixed". NY chapter 368 of 2026 and California SB 243 now ban or constrain the same features (D). |
| Ask which bots; keep use in a shared room; read chats together; say bots are built to agree | weak | AAP HealthyChildren page, updated 27 Aug 2025 [F]: cites no studies. Collier et al. 2016 meta-analysis of 57 studies [record]: restrictive mediation r=−.06, co-viewing r=.09, active mediation not significant overall (aggression −.08, substance −.11). Small, not AI-specific. |
| "Pediatricians' warning signs" (three listed on the page) | wording error | The AAP page names one sign: "Talk with your child's doctor if they seem withdrawn and prefer talking with chatbots rather than people." The other two items on the page are described there as risks of chatbots, not signs in the child [F]. |
| Common Sense survey figures used on Learn | charity's own figures | "Talk, Trust, and Trade-Offs", 16 Jul 2025 [F]: "nearly three in four teens" used companions, half regularly, a third chose AI over humans for serious conversations, a quarter shared personal information; n and method only in the PDF (not opened). |
A5. Policy: "find your representative and weigh in"
| Action | Grade | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Call or write your state legislator on a named bill | moderate | Bergan 2009, American Politics Research [record]: randomised e-mail campaign to New Hampshire legislators; "substantial influence on legislative voting behavior" (figures not in abstract). Bergan & Cole 2015, Political Behavior [F]: Michigan legislators randomly targeted by constituent phone calls on an anti-bullying bill; +12 pp probability of support; one bill, one state. Broockman & Skovron 2018 [F]: 3,765 politicians' perceptions, 2012–14; they "dramatically overestimated" constituents' conservatism, likely from who contacts them. |
| Write to Congress | moderate (staff self-report) | CMF Perceptions of Citizen Advocacy 2011 [F] (survey Oct–Dec 2010, 260 staff; question n=194): some or a lot of influence on an undecided Member — in-person visits 97%, individualised letters 90%, individualised email 88%, phone calls 86%; "a lot": ~20% individualised vs 1% identical form messages; social-media comments 42%. CMF Citizen-Centric Advocacy 2017 [F] (2015 survey, 233 staff; n=190–192): in-person 94%, individualised email 92%, letters 88%, phone 84%, form email 56%. Kalla & Broockman 2016 [record]: 191 offices; disclosed donors got senior access 3–4× more often. |
| Comment on a federal rule | weak for one person | Yackee 2006 [record]: 1,444 interest-group comments on 40 rules moved final rules toward commenters. NY Attorney General, 6 May 2021 [F]: ~18 million of the >22 million FCC net-neutrality comments were fake, broadband-industry funded. regulations.gov and ACUS guidance pages blocked today. |
| Evidence that any of this moves AI policy | untested / unverified | The 99–1 Senate vote and the 2026 state chatbot laws are documented [F-earlier]; who moved them is news-grade and could not be fetched today (search budget). |
A6. Settings (training and memory opt-outs)
Grade: none-but-plausible for any learning/attention/truth/safety outcome; this is a privacy act, and the page says so honestly. Mechanics: Claude and Gemini paths from primary pages [F-earlier]; Meta's 1 Oct 2025 post states no opt-out from AI-chat ad personalisation [F-earlier] [F-sub]; every OpenAI page returned 403 today [F-sub], so the ChatGPT toggle label stays unverified, as the page already admits.
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B. The highest-impact things one person can do, ranked
Ranking rule: evidence grade on the stated outcome × size of the stake for the reader and others × feasibility at a few hours a month. Each entry says what would overturn it.
- When you are learning something, use AI only in tutor mode, and keep practising without it. Grade moderate. Bastani (−17% on the exam for answer-mode, no harm for hint-mode, ~1,000 students), Contractor & Reyes (211; augmentation gains survived a week, automation gains did not), Anthropic (52; d=0.74), Kestin (194; a designed tutor beat active learning by 0.63–1.3 SD in less time), Nigeria (+0.31 SD in six weeks with teacher support). The honest gap: nobody has randomised what the user types. Overturned if a trial finds tutor-style use erodes unaided performance over a semester, or answer-style use does not.
- Before you repeat or share anything striking, find the original and pause on "is this accurate?" Grade moderate-to-strong. Accuracy prompts: 20 experiments, 26,863 people, false-headline sharing −10%; lateral-reading instruction: 7% → 61% correct lateral evaluations; human and machine detection: ~55% and falling in the wild, so process beats inspection. Communal: this is the one action whose benefit lands on other people, by cutting what you spread. Overturned if field studies show self-administered accuracy checks decay to nothing within days (Guess 2020 already shows the tips effect halving in three weeks).
- Take one platform, or all mobile internet, off your phone for two to four weeks; then keep feeds on Following. Grade moderate, with known costs. Allcott 2020 (well-being +0.09 SD, 60 min/day freed, news knowledge −0.19 SD), Castelo 2025 (well-being d=0.45, attention d=0.23, low compliance), Guess 2023 (chronological = less time, no attitude change). Do it for attention and time; it will not fix politics (Allcott 2024's near-zero polarisation estimates, 35,000 people). Overturned if larger pre-registered trials find no well-being gain, or that the attention gain reverses on return.
- If you have a kid: delay the smartphone and keep companion bots out, with other parents, and back a phone-free school day. Grade moderate for school and bullying outcomes, contested for wellbeing. Beland & Murphy (England, difference-in-differences: +6.41% SD on exams, +14.23% SD for the lowest quartile, nothing for the top), Abrahamsson (Norway, J. Human Resources 2026, event study: no average effect, but less psychological care use among girls, less bullying for both, better girls' GPA), Böttger & Zierer (five studies, d=0.162, stronger for social well-being). Against: Goodyear 2025 (30 English schools, 1,227 pupils: no wellbeing difference between restrictive and permissive schools, −0.48 WEMWBS, CI −2.05 to 1.06; in-school use down 0.67 h but total use unchanged; cross-sectional) and Vereecke 2026 (one Belgian school, 960 pupils, eight waves: no improvement, loneliness up slightly, no control group). Delay itself rests on associations (Thiagarajan 2025: smartphone before 13 associated with worse adult outcomes, especially girls; design and n not retrieved) and on the Haidt–Odgers dispute. Pledges (Wait Until 8th, Smartphone Free Childhood) have no evaluation and cite no studies on their sites. Overturned if a randomised or well-controlled roll-out finds no academic or bullying effect; settled by the same design for wellbeing.
- Contact your state legislator about one named AI bill, in your own words. Grade moderate. Two randomised field experiments at state level (Bergan 2009; Bergan & Cole 2015, +12 pp), congressional staff surveys (individualised messages ~20% "a lot" of influence vs 1% for form messages), and Broockman & Skovron (legislators misjudge their constituents because of who contacts them). AI law is being written in statehouses (NY, CA, CO, a dozen chatbot laws), which is exactly where the experiments were run. Overturned if replication in other states and on salient bills finds no effect; untested for AI bills specifically.
Not in the top five but worth keeping: the family safe word (cheap, unevidenced, the harm is real); turning off training (privacy, narrow); the companion-bot rule (now law-backed in two states, evidence of harm weak-to-moderate).
Where the evidence is young, and what would settle it. (a) Long-run effects of tutor-mode AI: a semester-long RCT with delayed unassisted tests. (b) Whether a reader's prompt reproduces a designed tutor: randomise the prompt. (c) Phone-free schools and wellbeing: staggered roll-outs with control schools (Goodyear and Vereecke are the weakest designs in this set and the most quoted against bans). (d) Companion bots and teens: anything beyond Fang's four weeks and Common Sense's expert ratings. (e) Whether individual contacts move AI bills: a Bergan-style experiment on a chatbot bill.
Drop / keep / re-rank (the Do page's current order)
| Current item | Verdict | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Step 1: think first, hints not answers | keep, lead | Best-evidenced action on the page. |
| Step 2: turn off training | re-rank down into the settings section; replace step 2 with "find the original before you share" | No learning/attention/truth/safety evidence; OpenAI label unverified today; the accuracy-and-origin check has 20 experiments behind it. |
| Step 3: check before you share, safe word | keep, move up to step 2; the safe word stays as its own line | See B2. |
| New step 3 | add: a two-to-four-week break and feeds on Following, with the honest expectation | Moderate RCT evidence for attention and time. |
| "Write first" | keep as a hint (already labelled) or fold into step 1 | 18-person preprint. |
| "Make it argue against you" | keep, relabel as untested | Only correlational self-report. |
| "Keep one skill AI-free" | keep | Mechanism supported; no trial. |
| Content Credentials | keep, demote below "find the original" | Rarely present; forged twice; no user study. |
| Gemini check | keep, demote; add "now video and audio, Google content only, ~10 checks a day" | Narrow. |
| "Don't trust your eyes or a detector" | keep; cite Diel's pooled figures | Strong. |
| "Don't swing to all-fake" | keep | Strong phenomenon. |
| Feeds section | keep as written | Already says "for your time, not your politics". |
| Kids section | keep; fix the warning-signs sentence | AAP names one sign. |
| Inner work | keep | Honest framing; not AI-specific. |
| Law section | re-rank up and make it an action: name one live bill in the reader's state, say what works (own words, one ask, a personal line), link usa.gov alongside Plural | Moderate field-experimental evidence; the page currently only links directories. |
| New | add a "don't" line: do not run a student's or employee's writing through an AI detector (61% false positives on non-native writers) | Liang et al. 2023; prevents a harm the page's own audience could cause. |
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C. Communal impact, backfire and group formats
C1. Who benefits from each kept action, and how much
- Tutor-mode AI. Benefit lands on the learner, and on institutions that write the tutor well: Nigeria's +0.31 SD came with teacher support; Tutor CoPilot's +4 pp (+9 pp for weaker tutors) came from AI behind a human tutor; Brynjolfsson, Li & Raymond (5,179 support agents) found +14% productivity with the gain concentrated in novices (+34%). Dell'Acqua et al. (758 BCG consultants): +12.2% tasks and 25.1% faster inside the frontier, but 19% less likely to be correct on a task outside it; a prompt-engineering briefing did not remove that. So the communal benefit depends on whether someone checks the model's reach.
- Find-the-original / accuracy pause. Benefit is mostly to others: the pooled effect is on what people share. It is modest (−10% false sharing) and decays; it also slightly lowers belief in true headlines (Guess 2020).
- Platform breaks and Following feeds. Benefit to the reader's time and mood; a cost to news knowledge (−0.19 SD; −0.098 SD) that the page should state. No measurable communal political effect at 35,000-person scale.
- Parents acting together. The quasi-experimental gains from school phone policies accrue most to the lowest-achieving quartile (+14.23% SD) and to girls (Norway); the null wellbeing findings are cross-sectional or single-school.
- Legislator contact. A 12-pp shift in a legislator's support on one bill is large relative to one person's cost; the backfire is structural: Broockman & Skovron show legislators already misread opinion because contactors are unrepresentative, so a message that states where you live and why counts more than a form.
C2. Harm and backfire, with evidence
- AI text detectors. Liang et al. 2023
[F]: seven detectors, 91 TOEFL essays, false-positive rate 61.3% for non-native writers, near zero for native 8th-graders; a prompt to "sound more like a native speaker" cut detection to 11.6%; authors "strongly caution against the use of GPT detectors in evaluative or educational settings". Groh 2022: a confident wrong detector output lowered human accuracy. The pages do not recommend detectors; they should say not to. - Surveillance of children. The AAP's own wording is "keep loose tabs", "about care, not spying"
[F]. CDT's Hidden Harms (Aug 2022)[F]reports LGBTQ+ students "disproportionately targeted" and low-income, Black and Hispanic students "at greater risk of harm" from school monitoring software (its survey figures are in the PDF, not read). Keep the page at "read a few chats together"; do not add monitoring software. - Moral panic. Odgers
[F]: unsupported stories "do little to support young people" and may distract from poverty, violence and under-staffed services (one school psychologist per 1,119 students). The page's kids section should keep its claims to what is shown (companion-bot harms in testing; associations for early smartphones) and not imply settled causation. - Liar's dividend. Over-warning about fakes helps liars on text scandals (0.17–0.21 SD) and makes true "AI-generated" news less believed; the page's "don't swing to all-fake" line is the right counter, and fact-checks cancel the gain (Schiff).
- Deactivation. Lower news knowledge (both Allcott studies).
C3. Doing it with others: which group formats have evidence
| Format | Evidence | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Phone-free school day (bell-to-bell policy) | Beland & Murphy 2015/16 (DiD, four English cities, +6.41% SD; +14.23% SD lowest quartile; no gain without compliance); Abrahamsson 2026 (event study, Norway: girls' psychological care use down, bullying down, girls' GPA up); Böttger & Zierer 2024 (five studies, d=0.162). Against: Goodyear 2025 (cross-sectional, no wellbeing difference; total use unchanged); Vereecke 2026 (one school, no control, no improvement). UNESCO [F]: 24% of countries banned in June 2023, 58% (114 systems) by March 2026, outcomes "not summarised". | evidence of working on attainment and bullying (quasi-experimental); wellbeing contested; depends on compliance |
| Classroom AI with guardrails | Bastani (classroom-level RCT: the guardrail is what removed the harm); Kestin (designed tutor, +0.63–1.3 SD); Nigeria (teacher-supported, +0.31 SD); Tutor CoPilot (AI behind human tutors, +4 pp). No causal evaluation of school AI policies as documents was found; RAND/EdWeek survey pages not fetched. | evidence of working when the tutor is designed; policies-as-paper untested |
| Workplace AI norms | Dell'Acqua 2023 (758): the "jagged frontier"; prompt training did not fix outside-frontier errors; Brynjolfsson (5,179): gains to novices, retention up; Dell'Acqua 2025 (776 P&G staff): individuals with AI matched teams without; silos narrowed. No study evaluates a written AI policy or disclosure norm. | plausible, specific norms untested; the one tested norm (a prompt briefing) did not help where it mattered |
| Family media plan (AAP) | Tool page is a JS app; no evaluation cited [F]. Parental mediation meta-analysis (57 studies): small associations, restrictive r=−.06, co-viewing r=.09. | plausible, untested; small effects at best |
| Parent pledges (Wait Until 8th, Smartphone Free Childhood) | Wait Until 8th: pledge activates at 10 families per grade and school; "more than 155,000 parents"; no studies cited [F]; 990-EZ 2025, revenue $142,637 [F-sub]. SFC (UK): delay to 14 and 16, "hundreds of thousands" of families, no studies on the homepage [F]; ambassadors include Haidt. No evaluation of either. | plausible as collective action; untested |
| Community media-literacy and prebunking campaigns | Guess 2020: worked for online samples (US +26.5% discernment, decaying), not in a face-to-face Indian sample. Roozenbeek 2022: six RCTs (6,464) with d 0.28–0.68 on technique recognition; a YouTube ad campaign (22,632 tested, 5.4 million reached, $0.05 a view) gave about +5% recognition; sharing discernment significant in four of six studies; durability untested. Maertens 2020: effect held three months with regular testing, decayed within two months without. Modirrousta-Galian & Higham 2023: in a signal-detection reanalysis the games did not improve discrimination, they shifted people toward calling things fake. | evidence of working on recognition; contested on real discernment; decays without boosters |
---
D. Organisations, tools and laws the pages name
Status as of 2026-11-05. "Filing" = latest Form 990 year on ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer [F-sub]. Controversy window: Nov 2024–Nov 2026, news grade unless stated.
| Item | Status | Filing / EIN | Flags in the window | Stronger or additional resource |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Common Sense Media | operating | EIN 41-2024986; FY2024 990 (revenue $37.98M, expenses $43.57M); Charity Navigator 87%, three stars (FY2024) | Its Institute is "funded by both philanthropy and industry, including the makers of some of the technologies we evaluate" (own methodology page, verified by me). 2024 OpenAI partnership (TechCrunch, 29 Jan 2024, news); 2026 OpenAI–CSM joint California ballot measure with OpenAI pledging ≥$10M (Benton summary, unread original); a SocArXiv preprint (Gilly, 8 Jun 2026, advocacy-affiliated, not peer-reviewed) calls this "watchdog capture". No lawsuits with rated companies found. The press-release URL still works; the site's /ai-ratings/ai-companions is a 404 — the live page is institute.commonsensemedia.org/risk-assessments/social-ai-companions. | Cite the Stanford Brainstorm co-authorship and the two statutes (NY ch. 368, CA SB 243) as the authority; disclose the funding sentence beside the citation. |
| American Academy of Pediatrics | operating | EIN 36-2275597; FY2025 990 (revenue $138.5M); Charity Navigator 100%, four stars | None found. The cited page is live, retitled "How AI Chatbots Affect Kids…", last updated 27 Aug 2025; no family-use AI guidance yet (AAP, 3 Oct 2026: "developing a separate set of guidance for family use"). | None more authoritative for US paediatric advice. |
| C2PA / Content Authenticity Initiative / contentcredentials.org/verify | operating; verify tool live (HTTP 200, JS app) | C2PA is a Joint Development Foundation (501(c)(6)) project; CAI founded and led by Adobe | Credentials forged (Nov 2023) and a signed timestamp tampered (May 2024), both fixed (Hacker Factor, expert blog); Meta's "Made with AI" mislabelled edited photos, renamed "AI info" July 2024 (TechCrunch). TikTok, YouTube, Meta and Gemini read credentials. | Pair with Gemini's verifier; say plainly that absence proves nothing (the page already does). |
| Google SynthID check in Gemini | live; images, video (<90 s), audio (<1 h); ~10 checks per type per day | — | The 20 Nov 2025 blog URL on the page is now 404; video verification announced 18 Dec 2025. Google-only content. No error reports found. | None for Google content. |
| FBI IC3 PSA (3 Dec 2024); FTC alert (Mar 2023) | both live | — | Newer: FBI PSA 15 May 2025 (verify via an independently found number); IC3 2025 annual report: 1,008,597 complaints, $20.877B losses; AI-related 22,364 complaints, $893,346,472. | Link the 2025 PSA and report figures. |
| Plural (pluralpolicy.com/find-your-legislator) | operating; "Plural Policy, Inc.", part of SAI360; sells bill-tracking to corporate affairs teams; absorbed OpenStates (2021, brand sunset 2023) | company | None found. Tool accuracy "not guaranteed" (its own disclaimer). | usa.gov/elected-officials (updated 2 Mar 2026) and the reader's state legislature site; Common Cause's lookup uses Open States data, so it is not independent. |
| EU AI Act Article 50 | applies since 2 Aug 2026 (Commission page, updated 19 Oct 2026) | — | Nuance missing from the page: generative systems already on the market before 2 Aug 2026 have until 2 Dec 2026 for machine-readable marking (Reg. (EU) 2026/1744, in force 27 Jul 2026; law-firm analyses, EUR-Lex rendered blank). Code of Practice final 10 Jun 2026, ~190 signatories. | Commission pages; OJ text for the transitional wording. |
| New York RAISE Act | signed 19 Dec 2025 (ch. 699); amendment S8828 signed 27 Mar 2026 (ch. 96); effective 1 Jan 2027; penalties up to $1M first / $3M subsequent; DFS oversight office | — | No litigation found. | nysenate.gov is primary. |
| New York youth AI-companion law S9051-B / A10379-C | signed 28 Oct 2026, chapter 368; effective 1 Jan 2027 (bill text §3; verified by me); AG penalties up to $25,000 per violation; more than one age-assurance method, one not relying solely on government ID | — | CCIA requested a veto (1 Jul 2026, trade news). | — |
| Executive Order 14365 | in force; DOJ AI Litigation Task Force created 9 Jan 2026; only visible action: intervening in xAI v. Colorado (Apr 2026); Colorado then re-enacted its law as SB26-189 (May 2026); no court ruling on the EO found | — | The page's title is the URL slug. The order's official title is "Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence" (whitehouse.gov heading, verified by me; Federal Register 16 Dec 2025). Child-safety exemption applies to the legislative recommendation, not the task force. | Federal Register (blocked today). |
| California SB 243 | chaptered 13 Oct 2025 (ch. 677); companion-bot disclosures, self-harm protocol, break reminders, $1,000 per violation private action; reporting from 1 Jul 2027 | — | The "in effect 1 Jan 2026" date is California's default and could not be read from leginfo today (403). | leginfo.legislature.ca.gov. |
| Wait Until 8th | operating | "Wait Until 8th Inc", EIN 83-0628912, Austin TX; 990-EZ 2025 (revenue $142,637, expenses $157,638); Charity Navigator not rated | None found. Site cites no studies; run by volunteers; Donate and Shop pages. | AAP media guidance for the evidence; no stronger pledge mechanism exists. |
| International AI Safety Report 2026 | published 3 Feb 2026 | UK-Government-commissioned; Secretariat in the UK AI Security Institute; chaired by Bengio; 100+ independent authors; reviewers include Anthropic, Google DeepMind, OpenAI | "Consensus document" is fair with the caveat: government-commissioned and industry-reviewed, not industry-written. | — |
| TinEye | operating; Idée Inc., Canada | company | Free-use terms not readable today (JS site). | Google Lens / Bing Visual Search. |
| OpenAI (parental controls; data-controls label) | every OpenAI page 403 today | — | Parental-controls details on the page are news-grade and unread today; the training-toggle label is unverified. | Someone opens Settings → Data controls in the app and records the label and date. |
| Meta AI | — | — | Meta's 1 Oct 2025 post: AI chats personalise ads from 16 Dec 2025, no opt-out stated, sensitive topics excluded; the US training opt-out could not be read from Meta's own pages. | Meta Privacy Center while logged in. |
---
E. Corrections to make on the pages (priority order; none made)
- EO 14365's title → "Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence".
- Kids section: AAP names one warning sign (withdrawn, prefers chatbots to people); the other two are risks of bots. Re-word.
- Replace the Common Sense
/ai-ratings/link with the Institute page; add its own funding sentence next to the rating. - Art. 50: add the 2 Dec 2026 deadline for pre-existing generative systems.
- Gemini check: now video and audio, Google content only, about ten checks a day; the 20 Nov 2025 blog link is dead.
- "Don't trust your eyes": cite Diel's pooled 55.5%; add the detector line (61% false positives on non-native writers; don't use them on people).
- Feeds and breaks: state the news-knowledge cost (−0.19 SD; −0.098 SD).
- Law section: turn the directory links into an action (one named state bill; own words; one ask; a personal line; 20% vs 1%), add usa.gov beside Plural, say Plural is a company.
- Learn page, fact 1: fine as is. Where the site anywhere says "meta-analyses show AI helps learning", remove it (Wang & Fan retracted; Bartoš).
- OpenAI: keep the "confirm the label" caveat until read in-app.
F. Staleness
- 16–20 Nov 2026: CCW Review Conference (autonomous-weapons line)
[F-earlier]. - 2 Dec 2026: EU marking deadline for pre-existing generative systems; EU nudification ban starts.
- 1 Jan 2027: NY RAISE Act, NY ch. 368, Colorado SB26-189, California large-platform provenance duties.
- Monthly: app settings paths; Gemini verifier limits; OpenAI pages (re-try).
- The research literature moves fastest on AI tutoring (two 2026 meta-analyses already; one retraction) and on phone bans (a 2026 J. Human Resources paper and a 2026 single-school cohort). Re-check both within six months.
---
G. Sources
All fetched 2026-11-05 unless marked [F-earlier] (also 2026-11-05, earlier session, per source/research/ai.md). Tag → who opened it (see Method).
Learning
- https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12232635/ — Bastani et al., PNAS 2025 (read via Europe PMC full text https://www.ebi.ac.uk/europepmc/webservices/rest/PMC12232635/fullTextXML; pnas.org 403) — research
[F] - https://www.anthropic.com/research/AI-assistance-coding-skills — 29 Jan 2026 — research (company)
[F] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.08849 and https://arxiv.org/html/2607.08849v2 — Contractor & Reyes, v2 4 Oct 2026 — preprint
[F] - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-025-97652-6 (PDF read with pdftotext) — Kestin et al., Sci Rep 2025 — research
[F] - https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/education/From-chalkboards-to-chatbots-Transforming-learning-in-Nigeria — 9 Jan 2025 — primary (World Bank blog)
[F]; working paper DOI 10.1596/1813-9450-11125 — OpenAlex record[record]; https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/43212 — 403[unread] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03017 — Tutor CoPilot, v3 10 Oct 2026 — preprint
[F] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08872 — Kosmyna et al., v2 31 Dec 2025 — preprint
[F] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.00856 — Stankovic et al. comment, 29 Dec 2025 — preprint
[F] - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/the-impact-of-generative-ai-on-critical-thinking-self-reported-reductions-in-cognitive-effort-and-confidence-effects-from-a-survey-of-knowledge-workers/ — Lee et al., CHI 2025 — research
[F] - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-025-04787-y — Wang & Fan 2025, RETRACTED 22 Apr 2026 — research (retracted)
[F]; retraction note https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-026-07310-z[F] - https://api.osf.io/v2/preprints/8vs32/ — Bartoš, Martinková & Wagenmakers, PsyArXiv 12 May 2025 — preprint
[record] - DOI 10.1057/s41599-026-07019-z — Wu et al. 2026 meta-analysis — research, abstract-level
[record]; DOI 10.1016/j.compedu.2024.105224 — Deng et al. 2024 — research, abstract-level[record](both via https://api.openalex.org/works?search=...) - International AI Safety Report 2026 extended summary — https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/publication/2026-report-extended-summary-policymakers — primary
[F-earlier]; https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/about —[F-sub]
Truth
- https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/search?query=Human+performance+in+detecting+deepfakes... — Diel et al. 2024, DOI 10.1016/j.chbr.2024.100538 — research, abstract-level
[record] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8602050/ — Köbis et al., iScience 2021 — research
[F] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8740705/ — Groh et al., PNAS 2022 — research
[F] - https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0285333 — Mai et al., PLOS ONE 2023 — research
[F] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02857 — Deepfake-Eval-2024 — preprint
[F-earlier] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10382961/ — Liang et al., Patterns 2023 — research
[F] - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s41235-021-00291-4 — Brodsky et al. 2021 — research
[F] - DOI 10.1037/edu0000740 — Wineburg et al. 2022 — paywalled, OpenAlex metadata only
[record]/[unread] - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-024-01881-0 — Kozyreva et al. 2024 toolbox — research, abstract and intervention list
[F] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9051116/ — Pennycook & Rand, Nat Commun 2022 — research
[F] - https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03344-2 — Pennycook et al., Nature 2021 — research (partial extract)
[F] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7355018/ — Guess et al., PNAS 2020 — research
[F] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9401631/ — Roozenbeek et al., Sci Adv 2022 — research
[F] - DOI 10.1037/xap0000315 — Maertens et al. 2020 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record] - DOI 10.1037/xge0001395 — Modirrousta-Galian & Higham 2023 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record] - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/liars-dividend-can-politicians-claim-misinformation-to-evade-accountability/687FEE54DBD7ED0C96D72B26606AA073 — Schiff, Schiff & Bueno 2024 — research
[F] - DOI 10.1177/2056305120903408 — Vaccari & Chadwick 2020 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record](sagepub and Loughborough pages 403) - https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/10/pgae403/7795946 — Altay & Gilardi 2024 — research
[F-earlier] - https://c2pa.org/faqs/ — primary
[F-earlier]; https://c2pa.org/about/, https://contentauthenticity.org/how-it-works, https://contentcredentials.org/verify — primary[F-sub]; Hacker Factor posts 16 Nov 2023 and 9 May 2024 — expert research blog[F-sub]; TechCrunch 1 Jul 2024 ("Made with AI" → "AI info") — news[F-sub] - https://support.google.com/gemini/answer/16722517 — SynthID verification help — primary
[F-sub]; https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/products/verify-google-ai-videos-gemini-app/ (18 Dec 2025) — primary[F-sub] - https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203 — primary
[F-earlier]; https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250515 — primary[F-sub]; https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf — primary[F-sub]; https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2023/03/scammers-use-ai-enhance-their-family-emergency-schemes — primary[F-earlier]
Attention and feeds
- https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/facebook.pdf — Allcott, Braghieri, Eichmeyer & Gentzkow, working paper 8 Nov 2019 (AER 2020), pages 1–4 read — research
[F]; https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190658 — abstract[F] - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11126999/ — Allcott et al., PNAS 2024 — research (Meta-funded, disclosed)
[F] - https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/DOI:10.1126/science.abp9364 — Guess et al., Science 2023 — research, abstract-level
[record](science.org 403) - https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.18393 — Bagchi et al. critique, 27 Sep 2024 — preprint
[F] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14652 — Piccardi et al., Science 27 Nov 2025 — research
[F] - https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/4/3/pgaf062/8052060 — Milli et al. 2025 — research
[F-earlier] - https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/4/2/pgaf017/8016017 — Castelo et al. 2025 — research
[F-earlier] - https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-00902-2 — Odgers, Nature 29 Mar 2024 — research review
[F] - https://www.afterbabel.com/p/social-media-mental-illness-epidemic — Haidt, 22 Feb 2023 — advocacy/research summary
[F]
Kids and group formats
- https://about.commonsensemedia.org/press-room/press-releases/ai-companions-decoded-common-sense-media-recommends-ai-companion-safety-standards — 30 Apr 2025 — primary
[F] - https://institute.commonsensemedia.org/risk-assessments/methodology — primary
[F](and[F-sub]) - https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/talk-trust-and-trade-offs-how-and-why-teens-use-ai-companions — 16 Jul 2025 — charity's own figures
[F] - https://www.healthychildren.org/English/family-life/Media/Pages/are-ai-chatbots-safe-for-kids.aspx — AAP, updated 27 Aug 2025 — primary
[F] - https://www.healthychildren.org/English/fmp/Pages/MediaPlan.aspx — AAP Family Media Plan — primary, JS app, no evidence cited
[F] - https://www.aap.org/en/news-room/news-releases/aap/2026/american-academy-of-pediatrics-provides-guidance-on-safe-equitable-and-effective-use-of-generative-artificial-intelligence-for-clinicians/ — 3 Oct 2026 — primary
[F-earlier][F-sub] - https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.17473 — Fang et al. 2025 — preprint
[F-earlier] - DOI 10.1037/dev0000108 — Collier et al. 2016 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record] - https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1350.pdf — Beland & Murphy, CEP DP1350, May 2015 (pages 1–5 read) — research
[F] - DOI 10.3368/jhr.0224-13403r2 — Abrahamsson, J. Human Resources 2026 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record](SSRN 403) - DOI 10.3390/educsci14080906 — Böttger & Zierer 2024 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record](mdpi.com 403) - https://www.ebi.ac.uk/europepmc/webservices/rest/PMC11984610/fullTextXML — Goodyear et al., Lancet Reg Health Eur 2025 — research
[F] - https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/developmental-psychology/articles/10.3389/fdpys.2026.1796471/full — Vereecke et al. 2026 — research
[F] - https://www.unesco.org/gem-report/en/articles/phone-bans-schools-are-spreading-worldwide-policy-debate-rages — updated 18 Sep 2026 — primary
[F]; https://www.unesco.org/gem-report/en/technology —[F] - DOI 10.1080/19452829.2025.2518313 — Thiagarajan, Newson & Swaminathan 2025 — research, abstract via OpenAlex
[record] - https://www.waituntil8th.org/ — primary
[F]; ProPublica EIN 83-0628912 and Charity Navigator —[F-sub] - https://smartphonefreechildhood.org/ — primary
[F] - https://cdt.org/insights/report-hidden-harms-the-misleading-promise-of-monitoring-students-online/ — Aug 2022 — research (civil-society report)
[F] - https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/search?query=Navigating+the+Jagged+Technological+Frontier... — Dell'Acqua et al. 2023/Org Sci 2026 — research, abstract-level
[record](SSRN 403) - https://www.nber.org/papers/w31161 — Brynjolfsson, Li & Raymond — research
[F] - https://www.nber.org/papers/w33641 — Dell'Acqua et al., Cybernetic Teammate 2025 — research
[F]
Policy
- https://api.openalex.org/works/https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08326967 — Bergan 2009 — research, abstract
[record] - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-014-9277-1 — Bergan & Cole 2015 — research
[F] - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/bias-in-perceptions-of-public-opinion-among-political-elites/2EF080E04D3AAE6AC1C894F52642E706 — Broockman & Skovron 2018 — research
[F] - https://api.openalex.org/works/https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12180 — Kalla & Broockman 2016 — research, abstract
[record] - https://api.openalex.org/works/https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui042 — Yackee 2006 — research, abstract
[record] - https://www.congressfoundation.org/s/cwc-perceptions-of-citizen-advocacy.pdf — CMF 2011 (PDF, pdftotext) — survey of staff
[F] - https://www.congressfoundation.org/s/cmf-citizen-centric-advocacy.pdf — CMF 2017 (PDF, pdftotext) — survey of staff
[F] - https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-issues-report-detailing-millions-fake-comments-revealing — 6 May 2021 — primary (government)
[F] - https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/managing-mass-computer-generated-and-falsely-attributed-comments — 403
[unread]; https://www.regulations.gov/learn — 403[unread] - https://www.house.gov/representatives/find-your-representative, https://www.senate.gov/senators/senators-contact.htm, https://pluralpolicy.com/find-your-legislator — primary
[F-earlier]; https://pluralpolicy.com/about/, https://pluralpolicy.com/open, https://www.usa.gov/elected-officials —[F-sub]
Laws and orders
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ — EO 14365, 11 Dec 2025 — primary
[F] - https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S9051/amendment/B — ch. 368 of 2026 — primary
[F]; https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S8828 and /S6953/amendment/B — primary[F-earlier][F-sub]; https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-nation-leading-legislation-protect-kids-ai-chatbots-and-ensure-baby —[F-sub] - https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai and .../code-practice-ai-generated-content — primary
[F-earlier][F-sub]; Goodwin (3 Aug 2026) and Houthoff (1 Sep 2026) analyses of Reg. (EU) 2026/1744 — news (law firm)[F-sub]; EUR-Lex — blank[unread] - https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_202520260sb243 — SB 243 text mirror
[F-earlier][F-sub]; https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/10/13/ —[F-sub]; leginfo — 403[unread] - https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb26-189 — primary
[F-sub]; JD Supra (28 Jan 2026) on the DOJ task force — news[F-sub] - https://www.insideprivacy.com/?p=15667 — Senate 99–1 — news
[F-earlier] - https://about.fb.com/news/2025/10/improving-your-recommendations-apps-ai-meta/ — 1 Oct 2025 — primary
[F-earlier][F-sub] - OpenAI: help.openai.com/en/articles/7730893, /12315553, openai.com/index/introducing-parental-controls — all 403 today
[unread] - https://privacy.claude.com/en/articles/10023580-is-my-data-used-for-model-training and .../10023548 — primary
[F-earlier]; https://support.google.com/gemini/answer/13594961 — primary[F-earlier]
Nonprofit filings (all [F-sub], charity's own figures / IRS data)
- https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/412024986 (Common Sense Media, FY2024); https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/412024986
- https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362275597 (AAP, FY2025); https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/362275597
- https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/830628912 (Wait Until 8th Inc, 990-EZ 2025); https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/830628912 (not rated)
Corrections, 2026-11-06
From the re-verification of 6 November (source/verify/ai-2026-11-06-additions.md): Wait Until 8th's site cites studies of phone harms, though none of the pledge itself (this file said it cites none). The Bartoš finding cited here is a May 2025 PsyArXiv re-analysis of Wang & Fan's data; a separate January 2026 preprint pools 67 meta-analyses and puts the bias-adjusted education effect at about a third.
Further, from the Do-page re-verification (source/verify/ai-do-2026-11-06.md): lateral reading took taught students from 5.9% to 61.0% (7% was all students before the lessons); the World Bank Nigeria study is an unpublished working paper (grade preprint; nine schools in Benin City; +0.31 SD overall, 0.23 in English); Diel et al. was read in the authors' manuscript on OSF (56 papers); accuracy prompts cut sharing intentions, not sharing.
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